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RULE 1.540(b), FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
IN SEARCH OF AN EQUITABLE STANDARD FOR RELIEF
FROM FRAUD
C. TIMOTHY GRAY
I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,' like Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),2 allows for relief from judg-
ments which for a variety of reasons should not continue to main-
tain their vitality. The rules establish various grounds for relief by
motion in the original trial court. In addition to the grounds for
relief under the motion procedure, Rule 1.540(b) provides for relief
through an independent action: "This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, decree, order or proceeding or to set aside
1. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) reads:
Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evi-
dence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusa-
ble neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing; (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other miscon-
duct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment or decree is void; (5) the judgment or
decree has been satisfied, released or discharged or a prior judgment or decree
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective application. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3)
not more than one year after the judgment, decree, order or proceeding was en-
tered or taken. A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a
judgment or decree or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of
a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
decree, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the
court.
Writs of corarn nobis, coramn vobis, audita querela and bills of review and bills
in the nature of a bill of review are abolished and the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment or decree shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action.
2. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) and FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) are virtually identical, except the
federal rule contains an additional provision which can be raised by motion at any time: "(6)
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Also, the saving
clause of the federal rule contains additional language. The entire sentence reads:
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a
defendent not actually personally notified as provided in Title 28, USC, § 1655,
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."
(Emphasis added.)
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a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court."3
This sentence (the "saving clause")4 has been the subject of vari-
ous interpretations by the Florida courts. The courts have strug-
gled to define the situations in which an independent action will be
allowed, and the differences between fraud contestable within one
year of the entry of final judgment by motion under Rule
1.540(b)(3) and the types of fraud which can be a basis for an inde-
pendent action after one year. The most recent treatment has been
by the Florida Supreme Court in DeClaire v. Yohanan.5 This com-
ment analyzes the current interpretation of the Florida saving
clause in light of past applications and the jurisprudence surround-
ing the parallel federal rule.
This analysis begins by establishing operative definitions of the
types of fraud that have been considered by courts in construing
the rule. Next is a review of the history and development of Fed-
eral Rule 60(b), which was the basis of Florida Rule 1.540(b). Be-
cause of the Florida rule's foundation in the federal rule, the treat-
ment by federal courts of the federal rule has a persuasive impact
on the interpretation of the Florida rule by Florida courts. This
comment therefore assumes that federal interpretations have au-
thoritative value in the interpretation of the Florida rule.
The treatment of the Florida rule in a series of Florida district
court of appeal cases is reviewed, with emphasis on two recent de-
cisions. 7 These two cases provided the framework for the Florida
Supreme Court's most recent attempt, in DeClaire, to define those
unique situations in which a judgment could be set aside more
than one year after the entry of a final judgment. This comment
undertakes a critical review of DeClaire, which held that an inde-
pendent action could only be maintained when the circumstances
of the case demonstrated "extrinsic fraud." In reaching this con-
clusion, the court eliminated any distinction between two separate
bases for relief from a judgment under the saving clause: "extrinsic
fraud" and "fraud upon the court." The analysis suggests that the
3. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b).
4. See Barns & Mattis, 1962 Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 17 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 276, 296 (1963).
5. 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984).
6. See Willis, Post-Judgment Relief Under Rule 1.38, 40 FLA. B.J. 1042 (1966). In com-
menting on the predecessor to Rule 1.540, Judge Willis suggested that "our Rule 1.38(b) is
taken from Rule 60(b) of the federal rules and cases digested under this rule certainly would
be very persuasive and perhaps controlling in a Florida court." Id. at 1045.
7. Brown v. Brown, 432 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Yohanan v. deClaire, 421 So. 2d
551 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev'd, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984).
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precedent used by the court to support its interpretation of the
rule does not demarcate "intrinsic fraud" and "extrinsic fraud" as
clearly as the court implied.
Finally, this comment concludes that the Florida Supreme Court
could have achieved its goal of protecting the finality of judgments
by an application of equitable considerations that other courts
have used when confronted with actions to open a judgment
tainted with fraud. It suggests that the court refine its interpreta-
tion of the language of the Rule 1.540(b) "saving clause" and re-
store the distinction between extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the
court. It also suggests that the court consider adoption of equitable
standards rather than relying upon definitions of extrinsic fraud
and intrinsic fraud, which have not been consistently applied by
the courts.
II. THE TYPES OF FRAUD
In examining the current state of the law in Florida as to what
circumstances will permit invocation of the saving clause to relieve
a party from a judgment obtained with the assistance of fraud, it is
important to classify the definitions applied to the types of fraud
with which the courts have had to deal. In both the Florida and
federal rules, one type of fraud is specifically referenced. That
fraud is "fraud upon the court." In Moore's Federal Practice,
Professors Moore and Lucas offer the following definition:
"Fraud upon the court" should, we believe, embrace only that
species of fraud which does or attempts to, subvert the integrity
of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the
court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual
manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented
for adjudication, and relief should be denied in the absence of
such conduct. Fraud inter partes, without more, should not be a
fraud upon the court, but redress should be left to a motion
under 60(b)(3) or to the independent action.8
Examples of fraud upon the court are "bribery or other corruption
of the court, or a member of the court participating in the decision;
[or] employment of counsel to 'influence' the court, even though it
8. 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 60.33, at 360-62 (2d ed. 1983)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as MOORE's]. But cf. Toscano v. Commissioner, 441
F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1971) (reviewing various definitions of "fraud upon the court" and ques-
tioning Moore's).
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is not shown that the court was influenced."9
These definitions and examples of fraud upon the court clearly
differ from the definition of extrinsic fraud which will support an
independent action. In 1946, the Florida Supreme Court character-
ized extrinsic fraud as
prevention of an unsuccessful party from presenting his case, by
fraud or deception practiced by his adversary; keeping the oppo-
nent away from court; falsely promising a compromise; ignorance
of the adversary about the existence of the suit or the acts of the
plaintiff; fraudulent representation of a party without his consent
and connivance in his defeat; and so on.10
In DeClaire, the court summarized its view: "In other words, ex-
trinsic fraud occurs where a defendant has somehow been pre-
vented from participating in a cause."11
In contrast to fraud upon the court and extrinsic fraud is the
definition of intrinsic fraud. The Florida Supreme Court in
DeClaire distinguished it as follows: "Intrinsic fraud, on the other
hand, applies to fraudulent conduct that arises within a proceeding
and pertains to the issues in the case that have been tried or could
have been tried."12 The classic example of intrinsic fraud is per-
jury, as the testimony of the perjured witness was subjected to the
scrutiny of the fact finder, and the determination of the fact finder
is considered conclusive as to the testimony. 3
III. FEDERAL RULE 60(b): ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Bases for Relief
The purpose of Federal Rule 60(b) and Florida Rule 1.540(b) is
to establish procedures for providing extraordinary relief from
9. 7 MooRE's, supra note 8, T 60.33, at 357; see Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co.,
169 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1948) (appeals court mandate set aside because of bribery of a mem-
ber of the appeals court in earlier appeal between the parties), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 912
(1949); cf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (forged article
used to secure patent was referred to in appellate proceedings to support patentee's case of
infringement and constituted fraud upon the court). Hazel-Atlas is the leading case on the
concept of fraud upon the court. The Committee Note on the 1946 amendments to FED. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) cites Hazel-Atlas as an example of fraud upon the court.
10. Fair v. Tampa Elec. Co., 27 So. 2d 514, 515 (1946) (relying on illustrations given in
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878)).
11. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text regarding
Throckmorton, which states the universally employed definition of extrinsic fraud.
12. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377.
13. Id. at 377, 380.
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judgments, decrees, or orders after the time has passed for filing
the usual post-trial motions in the original trial court or for seek-
ing an appeal."' The rule allows a party against whom a judgment
has been entered to file motions in the trial court issuing the judg-
ment for a variety of reasons that may have caused an incorrect
determination in the original proceeding. Also, under limited cir-
cumstances, an independent action, equitable in nature, can be
brought to attack a judgment.' 5 However, the ability to reopen
judgments under these rules runs headlong into the public policy
favoring the termination of litigation. "The problem of whether
and under what circumstances a final judgment should be assaila-
ble involves the clash of two important principles-that litigation
must come to an end, .. and that justice should be accorded in a
particular case .... "16
Prior to the adoption of the federal rule, courts maintained the
power to relieve a party from judgments and decrees through a va-
riety of ancillary common law writs and equitable actions.1 7 The
current version of the federal rule "expressly abolishes these ancil-
lary remedies."' 8 Under these ancillary remedies, courts could
grant relief for a variety of reasons. Fraud perpetrated in obtaining
a judgment was a major basis for these ancillary remedies.19
Under the federal rule, the power of the court to grant relief for
the reasons embodied in the ancillary remedies was either ex-
pressly enumerated in one of the categories available by motion or
retained in the independent action by way of the saving clause.2 0
The 1946 Committee Note to Federal Rule 60(b) comments that
there are two methods of relief available under the rule:
Two types of procedure to obtain relief from judgments are speci-
14. See 7 MooRE's, supra note 8, 7 60.09-.37; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2851-2852 (1973); Barns & Mattis, supra note 4; see generally
Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623 (1946). Because of
the language and history of the Florida rule, principles that can be drawn from the federal
rule by implication also apply to the Florida rule.
15. See supra note 1 for the full text of the Florida rule and supra note 2 for additional
language contained in the federal rule.
16. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 707 (citations omitted).
17. See 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 11 60.12-.15; Moore & Rogers, supra note 14, at 653-82;
Willis, supra note 6.
18. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2851. See supra notes I and 2 for language
of the rule.
19. See 7 MooRE's, supra note 8, 71 60.12-.15.
20. See DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377-78 (interpreting Florida rule as following the federal
rule).
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fled in the rules as it is proposed to amend them. One procedure
is by motion in the court and in the action in which the judgment
was rendered. The other procedure is by a new or independent
action to obtain relief from a judgment, which action may or may
not be begun in the court which rendered the judgment.2
As part of the dual method for relief, the power of the courts to
entertain an independent action was only restricted by the equita-
ble limitations that existed prior to the adoption of the rules.
"There can be no doubt, then, that the first saving clause pre-
served the equitable power of a federal court to entertain an inde-
pendent action to enjoin the enforcement of, or otherwise give re-
lief from, a judgment on whatever basis chancery would afford
relief. 22
B. Pre-Federal Rule 60(b): United States v. Throckmorton
The general rule that was followed prior to the adoption of the
federal rules was that relief through an independent action for
fraud could only be given for what constituted extrinsic fraud.23
This rule was initially laid down in the case of United States v.
Throckmorton.24 In Throckmorton, the federal government was
challenging the issuance of a California land patent that had been
granted some twenty years earlier. A forged document was used by
the patentee to convince a tribunal in the original confirmation
proceedings that the patentee was the rightful holder of the pat-
ent.25 In holding that the judgment could not be set aside, the
United States Supreme Court set forth the criteria upon which
courts have relied 28 in allowing an independent action to be
brought for extrinsic fraud:
21. See Committee Note reproduced at 6A MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.01[8].
22. 7 id. 60.12 (emphasis in original). Moore and Lucas refer to each separate clause in
the federal rule as being a separate "saving clause." Id. 1 60.31-.33. For the purposes of this
comment, the entire sentence in both the Florida and federal rules is referred to as the
"saving clause."
23. See Comment, Equitable Relief from Judgments, Orders and Decrees Obtained by
Fraud, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 80 (1935); Note, Injunctions Against the Enforcement of Judg-
ments Obtained by Perjury, 22 HARV. L. REV. 600, 601 (1909).
24. 98 U.S. 61 (1878).
25. Id. at 62-64.
26. See, e.g., Cuthill v. Ortman-Miller Mach. Co., 216 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1954); Chi-
cago R.I. & P. Ry. v. Callicote, 267 F. 799, 803 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 570 (1920);
Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 86 F.R.D. 131, 138-39 (E.D.
Va. 1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1128 (1983); Columbus
Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Mgmt. Co., 156 So. 893, 897-98 (Fla. 1934).
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[T]here is an admitted exception to this general rule [that judg-
ments are final] in cases where, by reason of something done by
the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial
or decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or de-
ception practised on him by his opponent, as by keeping him
away from the court, a false promise of a compromise; or where
the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ig-
norance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudu-
lently or without authority assumes to represent a party and con-
nives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,-these,
and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a
new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judg-
ment or decree, and open the case for a new and fair hearing.2"
While Throckmorton has been followed for the general rule that
a judgment can be reopened by independent action only for extrin-
sic fraud, it has not been uniformly held that the requirement that
the fraud be extrinsic is the "single limitation"28 on the court's eq-
uitable power to grant relief from judgment.2 9 Indeed, the weight
of authority in federal case law supports the idea that there is a
distinction between an independent action to set aside a judgment
for extrinsic fraud and an action for relief for fraud upon the court.
C. Cases Under and Commentaries on Federal Rule 60(b)
A recent example of a court drawing and applying a distinction
between an independent action for fraud and relief for fraud upon
the court is Great Coastal Express Inc. v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters.3 In that case, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed the facts in light of the fed-
eral district court's ruling that "such facts did not constitute fraud
on the court . . . or support an independent action for relief."31
The appeals court concluded that the particular instance of per-
jury in the trial court was not sufficient to constitute fraud upon
the court.32 The court, relying on the "doctrine [that] fraud must
27. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. at 65-66.
28. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 708.
29. See infra notes 134-62 and accompanying text.
30. 675 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1128 (1983).
31. Id. at 1351.
32 Id. at 1356, and generally at 1355-57.
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be 'extrinsic' to justify relief,"33 also held that the perjury did not
support an independent action in equity for relief 4
Some federal cases, however, have failed to explicitly recognize
the distinction between fraud that would support an independent
action and an action for relief for fraud upon the court. 5 On the
other hand, virtually all commentators have recognized that the
saving clause of Rule 60(b) retains separate powers to entertain an
independent action for fraud and to grant relief for fraud upon the
court. Professors Wright and Miller, after reviewing cases giving
various definitions to the phrase "fraud upon the court," point the
following out:
Perhaps the principal contribution of all of these attempts to
define "fraud upon the court" and to distinguish it from mere
"fraud" is as a reminder that there is a distinction. Any fraud
connected with the presentation of a case to a court is a fraud
upon the court, in a broad sense. That cannot be the sense in
which the term is used in the final saving clause of Rule 60(b).
The remedy for most cases of fraud must continue to be by mo-
tion under Rule 60(b)(3) or by an independent action, subject to
the procedural limitations applicable to those remedies.3 6
Another foundation for the proposition that the saving clause
contains separate and distinct powers to relieve a party from a
fraudulently obtained judgment is the history of Federal Rule
60(b). When Federal Rule 60(b) was first promulgated in 1938, the
saving clause read as follows:
This rule does not limit the power of a court (1) to entertain an
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or
33. Id. at 1358; see also Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883 (1972).
34. Great Coastal Express, 675 F.2d at 1358.
35. See Keys v. Dunbar, 405 F.2d 955 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 880 (1969);
Dowdy v. Hawfield, 189 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
36. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2870, at 253 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added); see also 7 MooRE's, supra note 8, 60.33; Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A
Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 41, 42 (1978); Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey
and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 542, 553 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Proposal for General Reform]; Comment, Attacking Fraudulently Obtained
Judgments in the Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L. REv. 398 (1963); Comment, Seeking More
Equitable Relief from Fraudulent Judgments: Abolishing the Extrinsic-Intrinsic Distinc-
tion, 12 PAC. L.J. 1013 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Seeking More Equitable Re-
lief); Comment, Relief from Unfairly Obtained Verdicts in Federal Courts, 30 S.C.L. REv.
781, 783 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Unfairly Obtained Verdicts]; Rule 60(b):
Fraud on the Court, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 554, 555-56 (1983).
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(2) to set aside within one year, as provided in Section 57 of the
Judicial Code, U. S. C., Title 28, § 118, a judgment obtained
against a defendant not actually personally notified.-
The language reserving to the courts the power to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court was not added until the rule
was amended in 1946.38 After reviewing other changes in the rule
allowing relief from fraud, the Committee Note to the 1946 version
states:
The amendment . . . mak[es] fraud an express ground for relief
by motion; and under the saving clause, fraud may be urged as a
basis for relief by independent action insofar as established doc-
trine permits. . . And the rule does not limit the power of the
court, when fraud has been perpetrated upon it, to give relief
under the saving clause. 9
In light of the history of Federal Rule 60(b), the conclusion can
easily be drawn that the powers to (1) "entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding," or
(2) "set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court," are clearly
separate powers that were retained in the federal courts in the de-
velopment and adoption of the rule.
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FRAUD UPON THE COURT AND
EXTRINSIC FRAUD SUSTAINING AN INDEPENDENT ACTION
Thus it is clear that the federal rule contemplates at least two
different grounds for allowing relief from a judgment tainted by
some form of fraud. Indeed, the difference in these grounds tran-
scends mere verbiage. There are important differences between the
application of the saving clause in an independent action for relief
from fraud, and the setting aside of a judgment for fraud upon the
court. Two of these differences are explored here: (1) the applica-
tion of the equitable doctrine of laches, and (2) the extent to which
a court can act on its own accord to set aside a judgment obtained
by fraud upon the court.
A. Laches
Laches is a doctrine that prevents a person from invoking the
37. See 6A MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.01[5].
38. Id. 60.0117].
39. Id. 60.0118] (citations omitted).
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equitable powers of the court for relief when that person has been
negligent in asserting his claim or when the circumstances are such
that it would be unjust for the claim to be asserted against the
adverse party.4"
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co."' is the leading
case in the interpretation of the concept of fraud upon the court.
The case was referenced specifically in the Committee Note to the
1946 amendments to Federal Rule 60(b). 42 In Hazel-Atlas, a fraud-
ulent article was used by the patentee Hartford-Empire to secure a
government patent on a new industrial process. In earlier litigation
between the parties, Hartford-Empire referenced the spurious arti-
cle in its brief, supporting a claim that Hazel-Atlas had infringed
on its patent. The Third Circuit, "[q]uoting copiously from the ar-
ticle," agreed with Hartford-Empire that Hazel-Atlas had in-
fringed on its patent.43 Ten years after the Third Circuit had ac-
knowledged Hartford-Empire's infringement claim and 15 years
after the inception of the fraudulent article, facts of the article's
forgery came to light in federal antitrust actions against Hartford-
Empire.44 Although Hazel-Atlas had made an effort to ferret out
the true facts concerning the forged article in the original case,45
the Supreme Court, in dealing with the issue of whether Hazel-
Atlas had been diligent in uncovering the fraud, noted that
tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indis-
putably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single
litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect
and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot com-
placently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society.
Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judi-
cial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants.41
Professor Moore and Professors Wright and Miller employ the
language above as support for the concept that relief for fraud
upon the court is not barred by the limitation of laches.47 Several
40. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (5th ed. 1979). See generally R. ARMSTRONG & W.
DONAHUE, FLORIDA CHANCERY JURISPRUDENCE 40-42 (1927).
41. 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
42. See 6A MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.01[8].
43. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 241.
44. Id. at 243.
45. Id. at 242-43.
46. Id. at 246.
47. See 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.33, at 355-56; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
14, § 2870, at 249-51.
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federal cases acknowledge that a true showing of fraud upon the
court would not be barred by the doctrine of laches.4 s
In contrast, where a party brings an independent action based
upon extrinsic fraud, laches can prevent the assertion of the wrong
by the aggrieved party. "[T]he power of a defrauded court to grant
relief is a sweeping plenary power that is not subject to any rigid
time limitation as is a motion under [Rule] 60(b)(3) . . . or to
laches of a party, which normally precludes relief in an indepen-
dent action . . . . 49
An excellent summary of the time limitations for bringing an ac-
tion for fraud under the various provisions of Rule 60 was given by
a federal district court in Lockwood v. Bowles.50 The plaintiffs in
that case asserted that a decree denying kinship, and hence a share
in an estate, entered fourteen years earlier was procured by fraud:
Perhaps recognizing that relief for fraud was barred by the one
year limitation period of Rule 60(b)(3) and that relief in an inde-
pendent action was barred by the doctrine of laches and by the
nature of the fraud alleged, defendants' primary argument has
been that they are entitled to relief for "fraud upon the court"
under Rule 60(b). There is no time limitation which would bar
this court from granting such relief. Neither the one-year limita-
tion period nor the doctrine of laches bars the granting of relief
for fraud upon the court. A court may "at any time set aside a
judgment for after-discovered fraud upon the court."
The court found that the alleged fraudulent testimony of a physi-
cian in the original proceeding was only intrinsic fraud which did
not meet the requirements for bringing an independent action, or
constitute a fraud upon the court.52 Thus the action could not be
48. Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1971); Root Ref. Co. v.
Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1948); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 86 F.R.D. 131, 137 (E.D. Va. 1980).
49. 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 1 60.33, at 356. Professor Moore, in discussing that an inde-
pendent action for extrinsic fraud continued to be allowed under the saving clause, noted
that "the time limitation upon such an action for relief from a federal judgment normally is
laches." Id. T 60.33, at 350 (footnote omitted). See also Carr v. District of Columbia, 543
F.2d 917, 926 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Casco Chem. Co., 335 F.2d 645, 652 (5th Cir. 1964);
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2868, at 241 (doctrine of laches applicable to
independent action); cf. King v. Dekle, 43 So. 586 (Fla. 1907) (laches a bar to bill in equity
to set aside judgment).
50. 46 F.R.D. 625 (D.D.C. 1969).
51. Id. at 631 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dausuel v. Dausuel, 195 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1952)).
52. Lockwood, 46 F.R.D. at 633.
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brought after the one-year limitation had expired. The court also
noted that even if an independent action could be sustained, laches
would bar it.5 3
B. Court Action Sua Sponte
In setting aside a judgment for fraud upon the court, a court can
act without an independent action being brought by a party to cor-
rect the injustice perpetrated on the legal institution. For example,
in Martina Theater Corp. v. Schine Chain Theaters, Inc.,54 the
Second Circuit said that if a proper case of fraud on the court had
been presented, a "defrauded district court would have been em-
powered to take action sua sponte to expunge the judgment. '' 55 By
contrast, for extrinsic fraud, a court may not act on its own accord,
but must wait for the aggrieved party to institute an independent
action that is equitable in nature.5
The Florida rule has also received a similar, although nonjudicial
interpretation. One article on Florida Rule 1.38(b), the predecessor
of the current Rule 1.540(b), noted, " 'Fraud upon the court' may
be established by an independent action, by motion or otherwise.
The exercise of the power is not dependent on any particular pro-
cedural steps being taken to establish it. The court may act sua
sponte.' '57
A conclusion to be drawn from these authorities is that the
phrase "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court," at least
under the federal rule, contemplates additional powers and proce-
dures beyond the ability of a court to entertain an independent
action.
V. FLORIDA RULE 1.540(b): APPELLATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS
The latest and highest interpretation of the saving clause of
53. Id. at 630.
54. 278 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1960).
55. Id. at 801; see also Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946)
(federal courts have inherent power to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by
fraud); United States v. ITT, 349 F. Supp. 22, 28 (D. Conn. 1972) (court can consider fraud
claim without intervention of nonparties), afl'd sub nom. Nader v. United States, 410 U.S.
919 (1973).
56. 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 1 60.33, at 357 n.44 ("[If the 'fraud' were not upon the
court and no party or third person with a legal interest desired to have the judgment set
aside, a justiciable case or controversy would not be presented and for this and practical
considerations the court should not intermeddle with the judgment.").
57. Barns & Mattis, supra note 4, at 293 (emphasis added).
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Florida Rule 1.540(b) is in the case of DeClaire v. Yohanan.5 The
Florida Supreme Court was forced to decide two primary issues
related to Rule 1.540: (1) the interpretation of the language of the
rule; and (2) the substantive issues underlying the language. The
case came to the Florida Supreme Court from the Fourth District
Court of Appeal 9 and was reviewed under the court's conflict ju-
risdiction." This case raised the substantive issues, while a case
from the Third District Court of Appeal, Brown v. Brown, 1 al-
though not directly before the court for review, lurked in the inter-
pretive shadows of the language of Rule 1.540(b). In the Brown
decision, the Third District evaluated prior Florida appellate cases.
Brown and the appellate cases it reviewed illustrate the develop-
ment of the interpretation of the saving clause in Florida.
A. Brown v. Brown
The issue confronting the supreme court in interpreting the lan-
guage of the rule was whether an independent action could be
maintained by a party only for fraud upon the court or whether an
independent action could be brought for other reasons as well.
This issue was never specifically identified in DeClaire but was
nevertheless addressed at least sub silento by its rejection of
Brown. The supreme court noted that the Brown decision raised "a
major public policy question relating to how final judgments may
be attacked and set aside. ''6 2
In Brown, the Third District undertook a thorough analysis of
Federal Rule 60(b) in order to determine what it considered to be
the proper reading of Florida Rule 1.540(b). 3 The district court
conducted this analysis because it concluded that, in light of the
58. 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984).
59. Yohanan v. deClaire, 421 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev'd, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla.
1984).
60. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 376. The supreme court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3), which allows the court to "review any decision of a district
court of appeal that . . . expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district
court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law." The cases that the
supreme court found in conflict with the Fourth District in DeClaire were Truitt v. Truitt,
383 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Erhardt v. Erhardt, 362 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978),
cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1979); August v. August, 350 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977); and Kimbrough v. McCranie, 325 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
61. 432 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Brown was overruled by the supreme court in
DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 381.
62. See DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 380; see also infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 14-39 and accompanying text for an analysis similar to that under-
taken in Brown.
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history of the adoption of the Florida rule, interpretations of Rule
60(b) by federal courts were persuasive in reading the Florida rule.
This conclusion was supported by considerable precedent."" In
fact, the supreme court in DeClaire noted that the Florida rule is
"modeled on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 . . [and] is
'[s]ubstantially the same as Federal Rule 60.' "
On the basis of its analysis of the federal rule, the Third District
concluded that the Florida rule was derived from its federal coun-
terpart.66 It also concluded that the purpose explained and prece-
dent cited in the "federal cases which have construed Rule 60(b)
leave no doubt as to its meaning-any extrinsic fraud, not merely
'fraud upon the court,' is a basis for an independent action under
the rule." 7
The history of the federal rule and its influence on the Florida
rule lent ample support, in the Brown decision, to the proposition
that fraud as the basis of an independent action and relief for
fraud upon the court are separate powers retained in the saving
clause of Rule 1.540(b). The district court went one step further
and conducted a linguistic analysis of the saving clause. It con-
cluded that the phrase "or to set aside a judgment or decree for
fraud upon the court" is disjunctive of the other powers retained.
Its position was based upon "well-accepted rules of construction"
and upon the intervening clause in the federal rule. 8
With all of the support it could muster, the Third District in
Brown boldly stated that "our reading of Rule 1.540(b) is that it
permits an independent action to be [brought] upon allegations of
extrinsic fraud or an independent action to set aside the judgment
upon allegations of fraud upon the court."6 9 This holding by the
64. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 706-07.
65. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377 (quoting In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1967
Revision, 187 So. .2d 598, 631 (Fla. 1966)). See also Brown, 432 So. 2d at 706-07, and cases
cited therein for the proposition that interpretations of the Florida rule should generally
conform with the federal rule.
66. See cases discussed in Brown, 432 So. 2d at 706-07.
67. Id. at 708.
68. Id. at 710-11.
69. Id. at 714 (emphasis in original). While the conclusion of the Brown court appears to
be correct to the extent that it finds separate powers in the saving clause for entertaining an
independent action for extrinsic fraud and setting aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court, it may still tend to misread the rule. The Third District apparently reads the rule to
allow a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party (1) from a judgment,
decree, order, or proceeding, or (2) to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the
court. This view of the Third District's reading is drawn from the court's understanding
that the rule
preserves two distinct and separate powers of a court over an independent ac-
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court was bold because of a line of district court of appeal cases,
including its own,7" that had created what the Third District titled
"The Mischief of Alexander. '71
B. Mischievous Alexander
The Third District in Brown examined the case of Alexander v.
First National Bank72 and the "[d]escendants of Alexander
[which] abound throughout the state. T7 The court criticized Alex-
ander and its progeny for the implied, and in one case explicit,7 4
holding that the saving clause of Rule 1.540(b) only provides relief
for fraud upon the court and not for other types of fraud. The lan-
guage of Alexander that created the "mischief" of which the Third
District was so critical reads as follows:
Perhaps as a means of protecting the integrity of the court sys-
tem, the [Florida] Supreme Court preserved one historic method
of attacking a final judgment. The rule preserves:
"... an independent action to relieve a party from a judg-
ment. . . or to set aside a judgment. . . for fraud upon the
court."
The appellants' counterclaim clearly did not entitle them to re-
lief from the final judgment ... on any of the numbered grounds
specified in Rule 1.540(b), RCP. As demonstrated above, such re-
lief is dependent on a post-judgment motion in the original ac-
tion-the first being the power to entertain an independent action "to relieve a
party from a judgment, decree, order or proceeding," and the second, the power to
entertain an independent action "to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the
court."
Id. at 710. A more correct reading might be that a court's power to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court is not limited to an independent action, and that all of the clauses of
the federal rule, and hence the Florida rule, should be read disjunctively. See 7 MooRE'S,
supra note 8, 60.33, at 351 ("The third saving clause states that the Rule does not limit
the power of a court 'to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.' "). See also supra
notes 54-57 and accompanying text for the proposition that an independent action is not
necessary to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
70. See August v. August, 350 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Sottile v. Gaines Constr.
Co., 281 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 289 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974). In Brown,
432 So. 2d at 715, the Third District Court "recede[d] from dicta" in these cases "that fraud
upon the court is the exclusive ground upon which an independent action . . . may be
based."
71. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 711.
72. 275 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
73. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 712.
74. Erhardt v. Erhardt, 362 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1366
(Fla. 1979).
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tion. Appellants did not avail themselves of this procedure. The
only other procedural means available to them for relief from
judgment (aside from an appeal) was an independent action
grounded on "fraud upon the court". The question before us,
therefore, narrows to this. Did the appellants' counterclaim, as an
independent action, sufficiently allege facts showing that a fraud
on the court had occurred in the prior action? 5
Brown rejected the creative abbreviation given the saving clause
by the Fourth District and the reading of but "one historic
method" for attacking a judgment under the saving clause. The
problem that the Brown court found with Alexander was the
following:
By distinguishing only between "fraud upon the court" and all
other fraud, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, the [Fourth District]
arrives at the conclusion, totally unsubstantiated by the deriva-
tion, history, purpose and language of Rule 1.540(b), that (1) the
exclusive means for attacking a judgment on a ground other than
for fraud upon the court is by "motion filed in the same proceed-
ing in which the questioned judgment was entered," and (2) the
exclusive ground for an independent action attacking the judg-
ment is "for fraud upon the court." '
Indeed Brown did not argue with the result reached in Alexan-
der or the cases that had followed it. In fact the Third District
made it clear that the results of each of those cases could be ac-
commodated under its reading of the rule that an independent ac-
tion could be brought for extrinsic fraud, not just for fraud upon
the court."
C. Erhardt v. Erhardt
Another case that Brown criticized is Erhardt v. Erhardt.7e
While not specifically citing Alexander or its offspring, the Second
District clearly stated in Erhardt that it saw only fraud upon the
court as providing relief under the rule's saving clause:
75. Alexander, 275 So. 2d at 273-74 (emphasis and editing of Rule 1.540(b) in original).
76. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 712.
77. Id. at 712-13. The court felt that the circumstances raised in the cases constituted
intrinsic fraud and hence did not qualify for an independent action after the one-year pe-
riod for a motion had expired.
78. 362 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1979).
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Appellee contends that even though the trial court did not find
that appellant had committed fraud upon the court he could still
be granted relief under the last sentence of Rule 1.540(b). Appel-
lee argues that this final sentence empowers a trial court to enter-
tain petitions for relief seeking either (1) "[relief] from a judg-
ment, decree, order, or proceeding" or (2) "to set aside a
judgment or decree for fraud upon the court." In other words ap-
pellee views the two portions of the final sentence disjunctively
and finds two separate grounds for relief, one of which requires a
showing of fraud and one of which does not. We reject this rea-
soning. We read the final sentence to provide only one basis for
relief and that requires a showing of fraud upon the court.7 9
D. "Blurring" a Distinction
The conflict created by the decisions in Brown, Alexander, and
Erhardt may be more semantic than real. The holding of Brown
was that an independent action could be brought both for extrinsic
fraud and for fraud upon the court.80 The problem the Brown
court saw with Alexander and the others was a "failure to distin-
guish intrinsic from extrinsic fraud and to distinguish fraud upon
the court (a very special type of extrinsic fraud) from all other ex-
trinsic fraud. . . .The blurring of any distinction . . . is, as we
have already said, a misreading of the rule. '8 ' However, the spe-
cific results reached in Alexander and its lineage could have been
reached under the Brown holding. The impact of Alexander and
the cases following it is that extrinsic fraud is lumped together
with fraud upon the court. The problem with this "blurring of any
distinction" stems from the fact that there are differences in the
application of these separate concepts of the saving clause, such as
lack of a limitation for laches and the ability of a court to act sua
sponte when confronted with fraud upon the court.2
It is significant to note that, prior to the supreme court's deci-
sion in DeClaire, there was at least a genesis of acceptance growing
for the Third District's position in Brown. The Second District
Court of Appeal, the court that in Erhardt specifically read only
one ground for relief in the rule's saving clause, later endorsed
79. Id. at 71 (emphasis in original). Brown did not quibble with the holding of Erhardt,
only with its interpretation of the language of the rule. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 713.
80. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 714.
81. Id. at 712-13.
82. See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
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Brown's reading of separate powers in the saving clause:
[W]e agree with Judge Pearson's analysis in Brown where he con-
cluded that the last sentence of rule 1.540(b) must be read in the
disjunctive and refers to both the general power of a court to en-
tertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment
and the power of a court to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court.83
Thus, in Westcott v. Wescott, the Second District receded from its
"dicta in Erhardt that there is only one basis for relief under the
final sentence of rule 1.540(b), to wit, fraud upon the court."s4
In a recent Fifth District Court of Appeal case, an ex-spouse was
seeking to have a property conveyance that was part of a divorce
decree set aside under the motion procedure allowed by Rule
1.540(b)(3), but in a court different from the one rendering the
original judgment. The majority refused to allow a motion in a dif-
ferent court, but Judge Sharp stated in dissent, "I agree with the
view expressed by our sister court in Brown v. Brown . . . that
would allow an independent suit in this case [for extrinsic
fraud]."8
VI. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
SAVING CLAUSE OF RULE 1.540(b)
In DeClaire, the Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction
over the Fourth District Court of Appeal case as being in conflict
with Erhardt and other appellate court cases that had their foun-
dation in Alexander.
A. Lower Court Decisions in DeClaire
In 1980, Donna deClaire Yohanan petitioned the Circuit Court
for Palm Beach County to set aside a 1977 divorce decree which
incorporated a property agreement with her former husband,
George F. deClaire. Yohanan's petition was filed pursuant to Rule
1.540(b) and claimed that deClaire had misled the court by filing a
fraudulent financial affidavit in the original dissolution proceed-
83. Wescott v. Wescott, 444 So. 2d 495, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 498 n.2.
85. Cobourn v. Cobourn, 436 So. 2d 284, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (Sharp, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). The majority held that relief within the one-year period allowed by Rule
1.540(b)(3) could only be granted by the trial court rendering the initial judgment.
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ings, constituting a fraud upon the court." The affidavit was filed
in the original proceeding in accordance with Rule 1.611 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 7
The trial court agreed with Yohanan that deClaire had indeed
misrepresented his financial circumstances in the divorce proceed-
ing three years earlier. However, the court denied Yohanan's peti-
tion to have the 1977 divorce decree and attendant property settle-
ment set aside.88 The basis for this denial was that Yohanan knew
or should have known of her former husband's true net worth, and
that information could or should have been brought to the trial
court's attention. The court reached this conclusion because
Yohanan had previously co-signed financial statements presented
to a bank for the purpose of obtaining a loan. In addition, the
trial court held that Yohanan did not "timely contest the property
settlement agreement within one year. '
On appeal, the Fourth District Court first confronted the issue
of whether deClaire's action of filing a false financial affidavit con-
stituted fraud on the court."' The court felt that, unless deClaire's
action could be categorized as "fraud upon the court," Yohanan's
independent action would be "untimely."9 The court quoted from
its own much-cited opinion in Alexander 3 to explain the position
that the concept of "fraud upon the court" should be narrowly
86. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 552.
87. The pertinent part of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.611(a) reads as follows:
Financial Statement. Every application for temporary alimony, child support,
attorneys' fees or suit money shall be accompanied by an affidavit specifying the
party's financial circumstances. . . . If no application for a temporary award is
made, the parties shall make and serve the affidavits at least 10 days before the
trial if permanent alimony, child support, attorneys' fees or suit money is sought.
88. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 552. In fact the district court noted "[deClairel underesti-
mated his net income by approximately $1,775 per month and financial statements submit-
ted to various banks demonstrated a much greater net worth than that shown by [his] finan-
cial affidavit." Id.
89. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 376. The difference between the financial statements
Yohanan signed for the loans and the net worth sworn to in the divorce proceeding was
approximately $500,000. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 552.
90. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 552. The trial court found that "changed circumstances justi-
fied an increase in the child support award" and granted Yohanan costs and fees. George
deClaire cross-appealed the increase in child support and the award of costs to Yohanan.
The district court upheld the trial court on these two points. Id. at 552-53. The action be-
tween deClaire and Yohanan was subject to additional appellate proceedings, which are not
relevant to the issues of this comment. See Yohanan v. deClaire, 435 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1983).
91. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 553.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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construed so that it will not be used to usurp the policy favoring
the finality of judgments.' The court then went on to state that
"the public policy favoring the termination of litigation must yield
in the present case to the public policy favoring the filing of accu-
rate financial affidavits in dissolution actions." 5
The Fourth District Court concluded that Rule 1.611 was
designed to benefit the administration of justice by requiring par-
ties to file information with a trial court in order to expedite di-
vorce proceedings.96 It reasoned that deClaire's "fraudulent affida-
vit constituted fraud upon the court because a trial court cannot
properly determine what to award the parties or whether to ap-
prove a property settlement agreement without a true understand-
ing of the parties' financial condition. '97 The district court sought
to implement an enforcement mechanism for Rule 1.611 by hold-
ing that
when a trial court determines a financial affidavit required by
Rule 1.611 has been filed fraudulently .... the offending party
has committed fraud on the court and the one year time limit in
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) will not bar an indepen-
dent action to set aside a final judgment of dissolution.9
The district court reversed the trial court and remanded with in-
structions to vacate the property settlement agreement and con-
duct further proceedings.99
B. The DeClaire Interpretation of the Saving Clause-Only
One Basis for Relief
DeClaire gave the Florida Supreme Court the opportunity to rid
the law of the "Mischief of Alexander." Its decision could have
restored to the saving clause an interpretation that recognized two
separate powers retained by the courts: one, to entertain an inde-
94. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 553.
95. Id.
96. See supra note 87 for text of rule.
97. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 553. The Fourth District Court used Rule 1.611 to support
the setting aside of the property settlement. However Rule 1.611 does not refer to property
settlements, only to "temporary [or permanent] alimony, child support, attorneys' fees or
suit money." See supra note 87 for text of Rule 1.611(a). Where a property settlement is
joined with another of these elements in a dissolution proceeding, it would seem that the
policy behind the rule should continue to have vitality.
98. DeClaire, 421 So. 2d at 553.
99. Id.
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pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding; and two, to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
An analysis of the supreme court's opinion reveals that the inter-
pretation of language of the saving clause continues to be
unsettled.
The court began its review of the Fourth District's holding in
deClaire by setting forth historical definitions of extrinsic and in-
trinsic fraud. 100 The court fell into the same trap as the Alexander
line of cases, that is, the "failure to distinguish intrinsic from ex-
trinsic fraud and to distinguish fraud upon the court (a very spe-
cial type of extrinsic fraud) from all other extrinsic fraud."' 1 1 The
supreme court said, "At the outset we must distinguish between
extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud because only extrinsic fraud
may constitute fraud on the court."' 012 While its definitions of in-
trinsic fraud and extrinsic fraud comport with recognized defini-
tions, the court failed to label fraud upon the court as a unique
species of fraud and continued the "blurring of any distinction"'0 3
between extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court.
In one part of the opinion, the court apparently wanted to delin-
eate clearly the time limits controlling when actions for relief from
judgments could be brought. In this effort to assist practitioners
and the courts, the supreme court set forth categories to provide "a
better understanding, [of] the circumstances under which a judg-
ment may be challenged." After listing the circumstances under
which a judgment may be reopened in one year, the court provided
that there would be no time limitation under Rule 1.540(b) or an
independent action in several situations, including "[e]xtrinsic
fraud which prevents a party from having an opportunity to pre-
sent his case in court.'1 0 4
The court, however, continued to baffle a reader who might be
persuaded that extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court are differ-
ent, saying, "The rule does not change the existing definitions of
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud or change the type of conduct which
constitutes fraud upon the court."' 0 5 The court gave no examples
of what conduct it considered fraud upon the court, except the def-
initions of extrinsic fraud it had quoted earlier.
100. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 376-77.
101. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 712.
102. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 376-77.
103. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 713.
104. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 378-79.
105. Id. at 379.
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C. Intrinsic Fraud-Not a Basis for Relief
The substantive holding of the DeClaire decision also requires
comment, as it too has left some questions unanswered. Because
the court continued the general rule that only extrinsic fraud, also
called "fraud upon the court," qualifies for an independent action,
it continued to rely on labels for when an independent action can
be brought.
After tracing the development of the Florida rule, the court reaf-
firmed that only extrinsic fraud/fraud upon the court could qualify
for an independent action after the one year period allowed in
Rule 1.540(b)(3) had passed. 0 6 Scrutinizing the fraudulent affida-
vit of deClaire in light of Rule 1.540(b) and the definitions that it
had given, the court reasoned that the affidavits "were part of the
record in this case. The issue of [deClaire's] net worth was, there-
fore, a matter before the court for resolution and could have been
tried. ' 10 7 The court expressed concern that if deClaire's actions
were allowed to be considered fraud upon the court,
[iut would permit any final judgment to be attacked at any time if
a party could allege that an intentional misrepresentation was
made by affidavit, deposition, or testimony presented in the case.
By so expanding the definition of fraud upon the courts, we
would also be substantially expanding the grounds on which final
judgments may be attacked.08
The issue perceived by the supreme court was that the approach
used by the Fourth District would expand the avenues by which
final judgments could be brought under review via the saving
clause. The court's concern for protecting the finality of judgments
was expressed by the ruling that factual matters that could have
been attacked in the original trial proceedings must be contested
under Rule 1.540(b)(3) within one year of the entry of final judg-
ment. The following interpretation of the rule was clearly set forth
in DeClaire:
When an issue is before a court for resolution, and the com-
plaining party could have addressed the issue in the proceeding,
106. Id. at 378-79. Because the Florida court has given "extrinsic fraud" and "fraud
upon the court" interchangeable definitions, the term extrinsic fraud will be used herein as
defined by the federal courts.
107. Id. at 380.
108. Id.
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such as attacking the false testimony or misrepresentation
through cross examination and other evidence, then the improper
conduct, even though it may be perjury, is intrinsic fraud and an
attack on a final judgment based on such fraud must be made
within one year of the entry of the judgment. 09
D. The Court's Treatment of Brown
The supreme court's treatment of Brown adds to the bewilder-
ment of one attempting to decipher the saving clause of Rule
1.540(b). The cases which the court found conflicting with the
Fourth District's decision in deClaire were the same cases that
Brown had criticized for their implicit and explicit readings that
the saving clause only allowed a court to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court.110 The supreme court analyzed the cases that
were in conflict with deClaire mainly in light of the holdings of the
cases; that is, an independent action cannot be brought for relief
from intrinsic fraud after the one-year limitation for filing motions
in the original proceeding under Rule 1.540(b)(3) has expired.'11
The court then reviewed the Brown decision and concluded that
"the Third District did not fully agree with the reasoning of the
decisions in the [conflicting] cases." '112 It then noted the Brown
court's legal position "that rule 1.540(b) 'permits an independent
action to be relieved from a judgment upon allegations of extrinsic
fraud or an independent action to set aside the judgment upon al-
legations of fraud upon the court.' "113 The court cast the result
reached in Brown as, "although the wife's allegations did not show
fraud upon the court, the allegations did establish extrinsic fraud
which would allow relief outside the one-year limitations pe-
riod."'" 4 However, the Brown court expressly did not argue with
the results reached in the cases which the supreme court found in
conflict with deClaire. In fact, it found their results very supporta-
ble under the theory that only extrinsic fraud, and not intrinsic
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See supra note 60 for the conflicting cases. The court did not find conflict with
Alexander, as it was a Fourth District case and had in fact been cited approvingly in
deClaire, 421 So. 2d at 551. See the Brown treatment of the conflicting cases and Alexander,
432 So. 2d at 711-14.
111. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 378-79.
112. Id. at 379-80.
113. Id. at 380 (quoting Brown, 432 So. 2d at 714 (emphasis in original)).
114. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 380.
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fraud, will support an independent action. 1 5 Brown only divined in
the saving clause dual powers of a court to relieve an unjust
judgment.
The most opaque part of the supreme court's treatment of
Brown came when it concluded that "[t]he Brown decision and the
Fourth District's [deClaire] decision .. .raise a major public pol-
icy question relating to how final judgments may be attacked and
set aside.""" The court felt that to allow Brown and the Fourth
District's reading of the saving clause to stand would substantially
broaden the grounds upon which a judgment could be attacked
and therefore would not accord judgments the finality that they
deserve."1
7
The court then quashed the Fourth District's decision and "also
disapprove[d] the Third District's decision in Brown to the extent
that it conflicts with our decision in the instant case.""5 The
court reasonably explained the public policy issue it perceived: ac-
cording judgments finality when the factual matters were tried and
determined. However, the public policy problem that the court
perceived to be raised by Brown, and hence the extent of the con-
flict between Brown and the supreme court's decision in DeClaire,
are completely unelucidated.
A comparison of the substantive holdings in DeClaire and
Brown reveals no real conflict between the two cases. The rule of
DeClaire is that an independent action will only be available for
extrinsic fraud. Yet the court found that the filing of the false fi-
nancial affidavits by deClaire in the original divorce proceeding
constituted "intrinsic fraud and .. . there was no fraud on the
court in this case."" 9
The view expressed by DeClaire appears to be no more restric-
tive than the holding of Brown. Brown clearly supported the posi-
tion that only extrinsic fraud, in addition to fraud upon the court,
would allow an independent action. 20 This position, coupled with
115. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 711-14.
116. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 380.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 380.
120. Brown, 432 So. 2d at 711-12. The court distinguished this from "intrinsic fraud
which historically would not support an action attacking the judgment, and which therefore
could only be considered when contained in a timely-made motion under the rule." Id. at
712 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Some of the footnotes of Brown may have
given the supreme court some uneasiness. In one of the footnotes appended to the above
quotation, the Brown court pointed out that the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction has been
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Brown's agreement with the holdings reached in the conflicting
cases that were impliedly upheld by the supreme court in
DeClaire, leads to the conclusion that there is no real substantive
disagreement as to what conduct allows an independent action to
be brought after the one-year limitation.
Although the theoretical conflict between Brown and DeClaire is
undefined, and there is no apparent substantive conflict between
the cases, the conclusion must be drawn that the supreme court
has blended the terms "extrinsic fraud" and "fraud upon the
court" and the terms are now to be used interchangeably in Flor-
ida. Because fraud upon the court, as the term has been developed
in federal case law, "is typically confined to the most egregious
cases, ' 121 one can only hope that such a situation will not confront
the Florida court. However, the failure of the Florida Supreme
Court to distinguish the type of fraud that can be raised by inde-
pendent action from that deemed to be fraud upon the court leaves
a question as to whether the supreme court will recognize the sub-
stantive and procedural distinctions 2 when the separate frauds
are raised to assail a judgment.
E. Other Equitable Grounds for Setting Aside Judgments
Under the Saving Clause
Despite the arguably imprecise reading of the language of the
saving clause, the court's ruling that an independent action is only
available for extrinsic fraud is easily discerned. However, the ra-
tionale that the court used in arriving at this ruling should be
dropped under the (b)(3) portion of the Florida rule allowing for a motion within one year.
It further noted that "Professor Moore is of the view that the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction
should not even apply to the independent action." Id. at 712 n.5. Footnote 4, however,
seems to most clearly express the Third District's position:
As we have said, the final sentence of the first paragraph of Rule 1.540(b) was
intended to preserve all former powers of the court. Since, because of the doctrine
of finality, courts were not previously empowered to interfere with judgments al-
leged to have been procured through intrinsic fraud, they are not empowered to
do so under the saving clause of the rule.
Id. at 712 n.4.
This interpretation may itself be too restrictive. See infra notes 134-47 and accompanying
text for the proposition that intrinsic fraud was recognized as a ground for relief by an
independent action. See also infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text for the proposition
that grounds other than fraud were recognized as being available for relief by an indepen-
dent action.
121. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1356
(4th Cir. 1982).
122. See generally 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, T 60.33; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
14, § 2870.
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examined.
First, the court ventured a cursory analysis of the ancillary legal
writs and equitable bills that were specifically abolished by the
rule.12 The court then asserted that "[p]rior to the adoption of
rule 1.540(b), none of the stated grounds for a motion to set aside a
judgment, with the exception of extrinsic fraud presented in an ac-
tion in equity, could be used as the basis for seeking relief from a
judgment." '124 This statement by the court fails to recognize that
some of the grounds now available by motion were in fact cogniza-
ble in independent equity actions. One commentator, writing prior
to the institution of the current rule, stated:
[A] bill in equity will lie to relieve against a judgment at law on
any ground which clearly proves it to be against conscience to ex-
ecute such judgment, and of which the injured party could not
have availed himself in a court of law, or of which he might have
availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud, accident or
mistake without fault on his part or that of his agents.125
The court thus diverged from prior federal case law that ac-
knowledges that an independent action can be brought under the
companion federal rule to correct a mistake. In West Virginia Oil
& Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 126 the Fifth Circuit was
faced with deciding whether a "compromise agreement and a judg-
ment based thereon" containing descriptions to property different
from what the parties thought they were originally agreeing to
could be corrected.12 7 The court found that the mistake was not a
clerical mistake under Rule 60(a), and since over a year had
passed, the action could not be considered under Rule 60(b)(1).121
Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Wiscon-
sin v. Michigan,'29 the court held
123. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377-78. This comment too will refrain from an in-depth
analysis of this part of the rule. See 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 1 60.12-.16, for a complete
analysis, and Willis, supra note 6, for some thoughts on these remedies in Florida practice.
See also Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 927 (1970).
124. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 378.
125. 1 R. WHITEHOUSE, EQUITY PRACTICE, STATE AND FEDERAL § 152 (1915) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
126. 213 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954).
127. Id. at 703.
128. Id. at 705-06.
129. 295 U.S. 455 (1935).
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that a court of equity has the jurisdiction and the right in an in-
dependent proceeding to protect a litigant from the effects, so far
as equitably possible, of a judgment entered by mutual mistake of
the parties, where it is shown that the party seeking relief is free
from fault or negligence.'30
If, as the Florida Supreme Court says, "[t]he Florida rule was
not intended to restrict the existing [equitable] remedies,''1 31 can
an independent action be brought for mistake or accident, which
were once recognized grounds in Florida? 132 Or, can an indepen-
dent action only be brought for "[e]xtrinsic fraud which prevents a
party from having an opportunity to present his case in court"? 133
The plain language of the case would seem to indicate the latter
proposition. However, the court, in a proper case, may want to lib-
eralize its narrow reading of the saving clause in order to recognize
all of the grounds that qualified in equity for an independent
action.
VII. THE COURT'S INTRINSIC-EXTRINSIC FRAUD DISTINCTION-AN
UNNECESSARY DICHOTOMY
Given the Florida Supreme Court's blurring of any distinction
between extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court, a final consider-
ation remains: the continuing distinction between intrinsic and ex-
trinsic fraud, with only the latter qualifying for relief by indepen-
dent action under the saving clause. The public policy that the
court wants to enforce by maintaining this distinction is to give,
within reasonable limitations, repose to judgments. The court ap-
parently feels that categorizing the type of fraud perpetrated on a
defendant in an original proceeding is the desirable method for
granting finality to judgments:
"Fraud on the court" is a somewhat elusive concept. . . .If it
is given a broad application so as to comprehend any type of mis-
130. West Virginia Oil & Gas, 213 F.2d at 707; see also 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, I
60.36-.37[2] and cases cited therein; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2868, at 239-
40.
131. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377.
132. See Alabama Hotel Co. v. L.J. Mott Iron Works, 98 So. 825, 826 (Fla. 1924); see
also R. ARMSTRONG & W. DONAHUE, supra note 40, at 371, 373 (decrees obtained by fraud,
mistake, or surprise are impeachable by original bill).
133. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 379; cf. Mills v. Mills, 339 So. 2d 681, 684 (Fla. 1st DCA
1976) (relief for mistake must be raised by motion within one year); Wilder v. Wilder, 251
So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
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representation by a witness or party which induced an incorrect
factual determination by the trier of fact, judgments would be
subject to frequent attack by independent actions, and the time
for such attacks would be limited only by laches. The policy of
the law which favors the termination of litigation suggests that
such a broad application of the concept is unwarranted. So too
does the policy of Rule 1.540(b), RCP, which promotes non-ap-
pellate attacks on a final judgment by motion in the original ac-
tion-not by independent actions."'
The rationale adopted by the court in construing the saving
clause as only allowing an independent action for extrinsic fraud is
certainly the majority rule among the states,3 5 and has support in
Florida precedent. 136 It is not, however, the universal rule. There is
a line of authority which takes the position that intrinsic fraud can
support an independent action and that other tests can be em-
ployed to protect the sanctity of a judgment.
A. Federal Decisions Rejecting the Distinction
The federal line of authority begins with Marshall v. Holmes,
1 3 7
thirteen years after the Supreme Court rendered the
Throckmorton decision. In Marshall the Court held that a federal
court could review a state judgment tainted by fraud when proper
jurisdictional requirements were met. 38 The fraud alleged in that
case, "false testimony and forged documents," was clearly intrinsic
fraud."3 9 The Court avoided the language of Throckmorton and the
type of fraud it apparently required and instead chose to rely on a
court's inherent power to seek equity:
While, as a general rule, a defense cannot be set up in equity
which has been fully and fairly tried at law, and although, in view
of the large powers now exercised by courts of law over their judg-
ments, a court of the United States, sitting in equity, will not as-
sume to control such judgments for the purpose of simply giving a
new trial, it is settled doctrine that "any fact which clearly proves
it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which
134. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 379 (quoting Alexander, 275 So. 2d at 274).
135. See generally 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.37[1].
136. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Flowers, 183 So. 811, 816 (Fla. 1938); Wescott v. Wescott, 444
So. 2d 495, 497-98 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); MacFadden v. Muckerman, 116 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla.
3d DCA 1959).
137. 141 U.S. 589 (1891).
138. Id. at 600-01.
139. Id. at 590.
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the injured party could not have availed himself in a court of law,
or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was pre-
vented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence
in himself or his agents, will justify an application to a court of
chancery. '1 40
The decision in Throckmorton is relegated to a "see also"
reference. 141
In light of this conflict between Throckmorton and Marshall,
one federal circuit court of appeals sought reconciliation from the
United States Supreme Court, but was thwarted when the Court
refrained from addressing the conflict because of technical consid-
erations relating to the Court's power to consider a certified ques-
tion. 14 12 While "the federal cases generally adhere, at least in state-
ment," to Throckmorton,143 there is some federal authority
following Marshall and rejecting "the harsh rule" of
Throckmorton.14'
B. State Cases Rejecting the Distinction
State courts too have chosen not to follow Throckmorton
blindly, and have instead opted for the equity-based approach of
Marshall. By 1909, Wisconsin had rejected Throckmorton as "per-
haps not broad enough to cover all cases which might arise where a
court of equity would enjoin the enforcement of a judgment. 1 4 5
The leading state case which interpreted a saving clause virtually
identical to the Florida and federal saving clauses to allow an inde-
pendent action for intrinsic fraud is the New Jersey case of Sham-
mas v. Shammas.146 After pointing out the ambiguity of the federal
rule, Justice William Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, wrote: "[U]pon principle, we hold that relief for
fraud upon the court may be allowed under our rule whether the
140. Id. at 596 (quoting Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 332, 336 (1813)).
141. Marshall, 141 U.S. at 596.
142. Graver v. Faurot, 162 U.S. 435 (1896).
143. 7 MOORE's, supra note 8, $ 60.37[11, at 379-80.
144. Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1939). See cases cited at 7
MooRE's, supra note 8, 60.37[1], at 377 n.23; see also Woodrum v. Southern Ry. Co., 571
F. Supp. 352, 357 (M.D. Ga. 1983) ("persuasive authority counsels against reviving this [in-
trinsic-extrinsic] distinction in the independent action procedure"). But see Williams v.
Board of Regents, 90 F.R.D. 140 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
145. Boring v. Ott, 119 N.W. 865, 867 (Wis. 1909).
146. 88 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1952). The language of the New Jersey rule is set forth id. at 207.
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fraud charged is denominated intrinsic or extrinsic.' 147
C. The Commentators' Rejection
Legal commentators also agree that the distinction between in-
trinsic and extrinsic fraud should be abolished for an independent
action under the saving clause. "[A]t times it is a journey into fu-
tility to attempt a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic mat-
ter . . .[and] little is to be gained by a rigid classification of fraud
into intrinsic and extrinsic categories."'11 8 The distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud for an independent action "is most
unfortunate . . . .The distinction rests on clouded and confused
authorities, its soundness as a matter of policy is very doubtful,
and it is extremely difficult to apply. It ought not to persist as a
limit on independent actions now that it has been abolished for
motions."1" 9
VIII. AN ALTERNATIVE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
JUDGMENTS-PRECEDENT FOR AN EQUITABLE STANDARD
The certainty of judgments that the principles of res judicata
require is protected in the cases and by the commentators cited
above, but not by resort to technical labels. Instead, they focus on
the plaintiff in the independent action, judging whether the person
has a right to invoke the equitable power of the court to reopen a
judgment. One standard that a complainant must meet was offered
by Justice Brennan in Shammas:
Perjured testimony that warrants disturbance of a final judgment
must be shown by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to
have been, not false merely, but to have been willfully and pur-
posely falsely given, and to have been material to the issue tried
and not merely cumulative but probably to have controlled the
result. Further, a party seeking to be relieved from the judgment
must show that the fact of the falsity of the testimony could not
have been discovered by reasonable diligence in time to offset it
at the trial or that for other good reason the failure to use dili-
147. Id. at 208.
148. 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.3711], at 377-78.
149. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 2868, at 240-41 (footnotes omitted). See
also Comment, supra note 23; Comment, Proposal for General Reform, supra note 36; Corn-
ment, Seeking More Equitable Relief, supra note 36; Comment, Unfairly Obtained Ver-
dicts, supra note 36.
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gence is in all the circumstances not a bar to relief.150
One commentator has recently suggested that the following equi-
table standard be added to California's rule pertaining to relief
from judgments:
The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud is abolished
and has no effect on the grant or denial of relief in an indepen-
dent action. Instead, the following equitable factors should be
considered: the existence of a meritorious defense, diligence in the
seeking of relief, the existence of the party's own negligence and
fault, and such other factors as the court may deem
appropriate. 15'
Indeed, one court that specifically rejected the intrinsic-extrinsic
distinction denied relief on the basis of standards that foreshad-
owed those suggested by Justice Brennan and the California
commentator. 152
The cases and commentaries which reject reliance on the intrin-
sic-extrinsic distinction consider instead the conduct of the de-
frauded plaintiff and the entirety of the circumstances at the time
when the independent action is brought. These considerations are
the bases and limitations for granting relief, not "highly technical
distinctions such as that between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud." 153
Professors Moore and Lucas reason that the results reached in spe-
cific cases may not differ under the two standards:
We believe, however, that the result which would be reached
under our proposed [equitable] formulation of the rule is not, on
the whole, very different than courts now reach under the
Throckmorton rule when it is wisely and liberally applied; that on
the whole the results being reached under Throckmorton are
sound and warranted in the interest of finality; but that in the
close, borderline case our proposed formulation would insure a
just result reached with less indirection than, and occasionally not
achieved at all, under the present orthodox doctrine.1T
150. Shammas, 88 A.2d at 208-09.
151. Comment, Seeking More Equitable Relief, supra note 36, at 1037; see also 7
MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.37[1], at 377-79; Comment, Proposal for General Reform, supra
note 36, at 570.
152. See Boring, 119 N.W. at 867-70.
153. Nelson, Bill of Review: The Requirement of Extrinsic Fraud, 30 BAYLOR L. REV.
539, 548 (1978).
154. 7 MOORE'S, supra note 8, 60.3711], at 380.
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While Florida has reaffirmed its dedication to the "orthodox
doctrine," the view that seeks to eliminate the distinction is not
without recent converts in other states. In Compton v. Compton,155
a case very similar to DeClaire, the plaintiff in an independent ac-
tion sought to set aside a property settlement agreement entered
into with her husband at the time of divorce. The plaintiff claimed
that the husband had fraudulently withheld information concern-
ing community property and that, on the basis of the information
given, she entered into an agreement which resulted in a division
to her detriment. In examining the property agreement and di-
vorce decree, the Idaho court found that the agreement was evi-
dence in the divorce proceeding and made a part of the divorce
decree. 156 These factual circumstances would appear to meet the
Florida Supreme Court's concept of the type of fraud which pre-
cludes subsequent independent action:
"[I]f a judgment was obtained upon false testimony or a fraudu-
lent instrument and the parties were heard, the evidence submit-
ted to and received consideration by the court, then it may be
said that the matter has been actually tried, or was so in issue
that it might have been tried and the parties are estopped to set
up an intrinsic or direct fraud to vitiate the judgment, because
the judgment is the highest evidence and cannot be contradicted
by the parties to it.' ' 57
Compton began its analysis of the issues by stating, "While the
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud may be easy to
state and understand in the abstract, it has proved extremely diffi-
cult of application to actual cases.' 58 The Idaho court felt that
"the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is simply an-
other way of phrasing the question, and is of limited utility in ac-
tually resolving it. . . . Invoking oversimplified definitional con-
cepts does not materially aid in accomplishing this task.' 59 After
reaching this legal conclusion, the court considered the facts of the
wife's allegations to determine if they could support an indepen-
155. 612 P.2d 1175 (Idaho 1980).
156. Id. at 1180.
157. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377 (quoting Johnson v. Wells, 73 So. 188, 191 (Fla. 1916)).
158. Compton, 612 P.2d at 1181.
159. Id. at 1182; see also St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 619 (Utah 1982) ("extrin-
sic-intrinsic distinction fails to provide a rational basis for the harsh legal consequences
which flow from it").
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dent action.6 0 Employing an equitable test similar to those noted
above, the court concluded that the plaintiff "fail[ed] to act on in-
formation she possesse[d]," and this and other circumstances did
not warrant allowing the plaintiff to bring her independent action
for fraud.16' Thus the Idaho Supreme Court shunned reliance on
technical definitions, scrutinizing instead the equity of the party's
attempt to invoke the remedial powers of the court. The court
found equity wanting on the wife's part and held that the finality
of the prior divorce decree should be maintained. 62
IX. FLORIDA PRECEDENT FOR AN EQUITABLE STANDARD
Why then did the Florida Supreme Court choose to continue to
use the intrinsic-extrinsic fraud distinction to categorize the ac-
tions of parties who may have used less than scrupulous means to
tilt the results of justice in their favor? The Compton case clearly
points out that the interest of finality can be served while eschew-
ing reliance on the definitional distinction. In addition, a minority
of cases and a large body of commentary have shown that "[t]he
perpetuation of this extrinsic-intrinsic distinction has led the fed-
eral courts into a thicket of inconsistency, because the distinction
is unnecessary, often irrational, and potentially productive of in-
justices not outweighed by the interests of finality.' 6 3 The Florida
Supreme Court at least brushed this "thicket of inconsistency" in
DeClaire by its reliance on two prior supreme court cases which
appear actually to apply an equity-based standard.
A. Johnson v. Wells
The court in DeClaire employed Johnson v. Wells"6 4 as author-
ity for the proposition that "[p]rior to the adoption of [Rule]
1.540(b), only what was defined as 'extrinsic fraud' could, in real-
ity, form the basis for relief from a judgment.' ' 6 5 In Johnson, for-
mer business partners submitted their dispute to arbitration. At
the arbitration proceeding, a "book of accounts was submitted to
the arbitrators as evidence of the transactions of the partnership,
and as containing the record of the accounts and moneys due and
160. Compton, 612 P.2d at 1183.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1183-84.
163. Comment, Proposal for General Reform, supra note 36, at 542.
164. 73 So. 188 (Fla. 1916).
165. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377.
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owing."' 6 Upon the basis of the evidence, the arbitrators awarded
a judgment to the defendant. Citing Throckmorton, the Johnson
court was "mindful of the decisions of this country supporting the
rule that a judgment will not be set aside by a court of equity be-
cause it was founded on perjured testimony or a fraudulent instru-
ment, nor for any other matter that was actually presented and
considered in the judgment assailed.111 7 The court continued, "But
we think that the circumstances of this case as disclosed by the bill
differentiate it from those cases in which the rule was applied." '
The court then listed what those circumstances were: the books
were kept exclusively by the defendant; the plaintiff was unaware
of the fraudulent entries, having been deceived by his partner; and
the fraud was not discovered until after the arbitration proceed-
ing.119 The court's analysis of the fraudulent records concluded:
So far as the case made by the bill is concerned, it is one in which
the defendant made up and presented to the arbitrators a wholly
fictitious statement, and one known by him to be such, and with-
out which he would have had no claim against the complainant;
that this statement and the consideration of it by the arbitrators
was made possible only by complainant's ignorance of the false
entries in the books of account and his confidence in the other's
honesty and fairness, and on this the defendant, Johnson, acted
to his own advantage. 17 0
The court upheld the plaintiff's right to bring the action to set
aside the arbitration for fraud 71 and was of the opinion that "the
fraud as alleged in the bill of complaint was sufficient to vitiate the
award."11 2
There are several problems with the DeClaire court's reliance on
Johnson: (1) the Johnson court never explicitly adopted the
Throckmorton rule; (2) the Johnson court never satisfactorily ex-
plained how the partnership records differed from "perjured testi-
166. Johnson, 73 So. at 189 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id. Although the court noted that the plaintiff in the action to have the award set
aside had been sick and unable to attend the arbitration proceedings, it did not refer to this
as a reason to allow him to bring the action. This situation, of course, would not constitute
extrinsic fraud because the opposing party did not seek to secure his nonattendance.
170. Id. at 192.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 191.
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mony or a fraudulent instrument,1 ' 73 saying only that the "circum-
stances" were different from the Throckmorton rule; (3) the
ledgers in Johnson seem to have been "issues in the case that have
been tried or could have been tried";1 74 (4) these "circumstances"
do not appear to differ substantively from the facts and circum-
stances of DeClaire as described by the Fourth District Court.1 75
While upholding the plaintiff's right to bring his complaint to
set aside the arbitration award, the Johnson court ultimately re-
jected the complaint under the following reasoning:
We have carefully examined the evidence, but have failed to
find the slightest proof of the essential allegations of the bill on
which the complainant's equity rests. There is evidence that the
books of account contained many errors, that the books appear to
have been inaccurately kept, but there is nothing whatever to
show that the complainant never had access to the books during
the existence of the copartnership, that he had no opportunity to
discover the errors which he claimed to exist, that his belief in his
partner's honesty disarmed suspicion, that he had no opportunity
to examine the books before they were submitted to the arbitra-
tors, nor that all the evidence submitted by the complainant at
the hearing could not have been submitted to the arbitrators, nor
that he did not have the fullest opportunity to present to the ar-
bitrators every issue which he seeks to have tried in this proceed-
ing. Nor is there any evidence that the defendant did not present
his claims to the arbitrators in good faith and upon the full state
of facts as he believed them to exist.1 76
This language closely resembles an application of equitable stan-
dards for determining the plaintiff's rights to remedy as other
courts have employed them and as commentators have recom-
mended. The proposed equitable tests and the Johnson decision
focus on the plaintiffs actions and the evidence of fraud in light of
the totality of the circumstances.
B. Fair v. Tampa Electric Co.
Another problem with the court's reverent adherence to the his-
torical custom that only extrinsic fraud could be subjected to later
review was raised by the other main case cited as authority, Fair v.
173. Id.
174. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 377.
175. See deClaire, 421 So. 2d at 552-53.
176. Johnson, 73 So. at 192.
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Tampa Electric Co.177 In Fair, the court acknowledged the rule of
Throckmorton178 but determined that the analysis should not end
there. In a negligence action against the utility, a material witness
committed perjury in the original action, with the attorney for the
plaintiff allegedly suborning the perjury. The procedural question
was whether the court had jurisdiction to entertain a "motion for
stay of execution and vacation of judgment,1 179 after the "term" of
the court had expired. 80 The court concluded that, because of
statutory enactments extending a court's control over its judg-
ments, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the motion. In light
of an earlier holding that reached a similar conclusion in a case
presenting extrinsic fraud,""1 the court held that it would not "ex-
tend and recognize [the intrinsic-extrinsic fraud] distinction where
motions for stays are made under the statute.' 18
It may be assumed that the court's holding is now embodied in
Rule 1.540(b)(3), which allows relief by motion for any type of
fraud within one year. However, the philosophy for eliminating the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is stated in Fair:
For the purposes of such a motion under this act we are unable to
discern any material difference between [extrinsic fraud] and in-
ducing a witness to give false testimony. From a moral standpoint
the latter seems more reprehensible, and from a practical stand-
point probably more difficult to uncover.
• . . [I]n arriving at our conclusion we do not think that logic or
reason prevents our holding that the circuit judge was warranted
in halting the enforcement of a judgment which he was convinced,
upon abundant testimony, was founded on testimony perjured, on
perjury suborned by counsel for the plaintiff. He knew that the
defendant in the case and the court itself had been deceived.
We are unwilling to subscribe to a rule that if a lawyer stealth-
ily fabricates testimony the judge of the court must stand by,
powerless to halt the enforcement of the judgment based upon
177. 27 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1946).
178. Id. at 515.
179. Id. at 514.
180. Id. at 516. The expiration of a court's "term" was historically the limitation on a
court's power to reconsider a judgment. After that time a judgment became absolutely final,
passing beyond the court's control except to the extent it was subject to an independent
action. See discussion of the "terms of the court" concept in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 275-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). See
also Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So. 2d 648, 653-54 (Fla. 1960).
181. Kellerman v. Commercial Credit Co., 189 So. 689 (Fla. 1939).
182. Fair, 27 So. 2d at 516.
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falsehood, simply because by the passage of time the period for
filing motion for new trial has elapsed and the term of court has
ended.""3
Thus, a thorough and critical examination of the cases upon
which the Florida Supreme Court relied to support its holding in
DeClaire reveals a lack of conceptual support for the intrinsic-ex-
trinsic fraud distinction. Fair enunciated the philosophy for elimi-
nating the distinctions between intrinsic fraud and extrinsic fraud
in the motion procedure of Rule 1.540(b)(3). Although Johnson
gave lip service to the Throckmorton rule, the Johnson court al-
lowed an independent action to open a judgment which was as-
sisted by what was seemingly intrinsic fraud. It then applied a se-
ries of equitable considerations to find that the plaintiff in the
independent equitable action was negligent in not being aware of
the fraud that was being perpetrated on him by his business part-
ner. It is difficult to understand why, in light of these cases, the
court chose to maintain the "troublesome distinction between in-
trinsic and extrinsic fraud"1" 4 for independent actions under the
saving clause.
X. THE EQUITABLE STANDARD AND DeClaire
An application of an equitable standard could have provided the
same protection for the judgment in DeClaire that the supreme
court sought through technical definitional distinctions. An exami-
nation of Yohanan's arguments in DeClaire and the circumstances
surrounding the situation reveals that, even under an equitable
test, her request for relief from the divorce decree was tenuous.
The supreme court noted that the divorce proceeding between
Yohanan and deClaire was a highly contested dissolution with con-
siderable discovery among the parties both before and after the
entry of final judgment.18 5 With the wide-ranging devices available
under today's discovery rules, it seems that the information con-
tained in deClaire's financial affidavit could have been verified.
Perhaps more easily seen is Yohanan's negligence in not detecting
or at least suspecting the fraud. Few would argue with the proposi-
tion that signing one's name to a financial statement for a bank
loan would charge a person with constructive knowledge of the
183. Id. at 516-17.
184. Truitt v. Truitt, 383 So. 2d 276, 276-77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
185. DeClaire, 453 So. 2d at 376.
1985]
888 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:851
family's net worth. When later shown a similar disclosure revealing
a difference of half a million dollars, the discrepancy should not
escape attention. Also, a difference of net income of over $20,000 a
year would be noticed by most reasonably diligent persons. Thus,
if the supreme court wanted to accord the original divorce decree
and judgment the sanctity the justices apparently felt it de-
served, i s' it could have rested on the equitable standard as applied
to these facts. 8 7 The court instead chose to run the maze of defini-
tions and difficult-to-apply distinctions that mark the landscape of
the saving clause of Rule 1.540(b).
XI. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the history and development of Federal Rule
60(b), which governs the procedures by which a party may seek
relief from a judgment, reveals that the "saving clause" of the rule
contains two separate powers that the federal courts can exercise
when fraud is alleged: (1) to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order, or proceeding; and
(2) to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court. Fed-
eral cases applying the rule also demonstrate that there are mate-
rial differences in the applications of the separate powers.
In light of the background of the federal rule, the current inter-
pretation of the counterpart Florida rule, Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540(b), in DeClaire v. Yohanan is anomalous. The
Florida Supreme Court in DeClaire embarked on a journey that it
hoped would lead to clarity in the application and interpretation of
the saving clause of Rule 1.540(b). However, a reader of the opin-
ion is left with an unclear rejection of a well-considered opinion of
Judge Pearson of the Third District Court in Brown v. Brown.
There, through an analysis of "history, derivation, purpose, and
language," he interpreted the Florida saving clause as retaining the
same powers that exist under the federal rule. This reading of dual
powers in the saving clause is well supported, but the supreme
court has apparently rejected it. The court's opinion blended the
terms extrinsic fraud and fraud upon the court into one indistin-
guishable basis for setting aside a fraudulently obtained judgment
186. All of the justices concurred, with Justice Adkins concurring in the result only.
187. There was another statutory ground on which the court could have found
Yohanan's charge of fraud wanting. She was seeking to have the "property agreement" por-
tion of the divorce decree set aside because of the falsity of the affidavit filed pursuant to
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.611(a). That rule does not address the use of the required affidavits for
determining property settlements.
RELIEF FROM FRAUD
through an independent action. By blurring the distinction be-
tween these terms, the court failed to recognize substantive and
procedural differences that seem well established under the federal
rule. Only a presentation of the proper case to the court will allow
it to rechart these murky shoals for the practioner who one day
might need to assist a client victimized by a person corrupting the
legal system.
Beyond the court's reading of the language of Rule 1.540(b), the
interpretation of the substantive rationale behind the rule also
presents unanswered questions. By laying down a bright-line rule
whereby only extrinsic fraud will qualify for an independent ac-
tion, did the court intend to foreclose the remedial power of a
court to relieve a party for accident or mistake, less common but
nonetheless recognized as qualifying for an independent action?
The plain language would seem to answer "yes." Under the right
circumstances, however, the court might find an alternative route
to this more obscure part of the saving clause and restore the other
equitable grounds that federal courts have recognized as valid for
bringing an independent action.
Finally, in continuing the "troublesome distinction between in-
trinsic and extrinsic fraud," '188 the court relied on decisions that
merely state the language of the rule without providing conceptual
support for the court's position in DeClaire. A critical analysis of
the Florida cases that the court relied upon demonstrates the diffi-
culty with which the rule is applied and understood and shows the
ease with which it can be be merely verbalized. One is left to pon-
der why, in this age of modern rule pleading and practice which
emphasizes substance over form, the Florida Supreme Court con-
tinues to rely on terms, labels, and distinctions that the same
court, almost 40 years ago, saw fit to abolish with regard to mo-
tions for relief from judgments procured by fraud.
The court legitimately recognized the need for giving judgments
finality, within reason, but this goal could be met by utilizing a test
that more readily allows for a recognition of the equities of a situa-
tion, without having to steer through inconsistent applications of
the Throckmorton rule. Cases and commentaries suggest that the
goal of protecting the finality of judgments can be obtained by the
application of an equity-based standard that focuses on the actions
of the plaintiff. By applying this equitable standard, courts are not
forced into classifying a wrongdoer's actions under technical defini-
188. Truitt, 383 So. 2d at 276-77.
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tions at the expense of fairness to an innocent party. A court thus
has the flexibility to protect a judgment when the policies of res
judicata outweigh the equities asserted by a defrauded party.
In DeClaire, the Florida Supreme Court bypassed an opportu-
nity to use an equitable standard in interpreting the saving clause
of Rule 1.540(b) and suggested that the rulemaking process was
the proper forum for adding powers to the rule. In making this
suggestion, the court shunned ample judicial precedent in which it
could have found an equitable standard. This precedent existed in
the Florida cases that the court relied upon to continue the diffi-
cult distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. Under the
proper circumstances, the court should consider the application of
equitable standards to the saving clause or, at a minimum, recog-
nize the dual powers that the Brown court discerned in the clause.
DeClaire is the rule in Florida today with which litigants, attor-
neys, and judges must contend. Its exact boundaries are yet to be
determined. The court surely wanted to leave a map with which
these jurisprudential waters could be sailed with confidence. The
course it charted, however, seems little more detailed and reliable
than those with which the ancient mariners began their voyages.
